Abstract. Variations in the labor wedge account for a large fraction of business cycle uctuations. We provide an interpretation of the labor wedge from a searchtheoretic point of view and assess the importance of job creation and job destruction shocks for business cycles. We nd that the labor wedge is mainly driven by matching shocks. However, in a recession, separation shocks account for the initial increase in unemployment, while matching shocks are responsible for the slow recovery. Finally, allowing for changes in the reservation value of workers can solve Shimer's puzzle.
I. Introduction
For the last 25 years, macro and labor economists have pointed to large, cyclical variations in the relationship between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and the marginal product of labor as an important feature of business cycles. In their business cycle accounting framework Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007, [5] ) (CKM) label this relationship a "labor wedge" and show that it accounts for 60% of output uctuations.
Many economists conjecture that changes in the labor wedge represent time-varying imperfections in the labor market, such as labor taxes, monopoly power by unions or rms, sticky wages or sticky prices, and changes in institutions and regulations. Search frictions haven't been examined as a potential explanation of the labor wedge, though shocks to job destruction and job creation have been shown to play a crucial role in the behavior of the labor market.
We develop a theory of the labor wedge and quantitatively analyze it using a model that features time-varying search and matching frictions in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, [18] ), Shimer (2005, [19] ) and Hall (2005, [12] ). 1 Then, using a methodology similar to that of CKM we identify the sources of uctuations and assess the importance of job creation and job destruction shocks to business cycles. Our modeling approach follows the path of Farmer and Hollenhorst (2006, [7] ) by assuming that workers can choose whether to participate in the labor force. The standard assumption that labor is traded in a spot market is replaced by a labor search friction which puts an additional constraint on how much labor can be used in production and has direct implications for the behavior of vacancies and unemployment. We introduce exogenous shocks to the separation rate and the matching eciency that determine how many jobs are destroyed and created every period, and incorporate an exogenous process, governing uctuations in the bargaining power, general enough to mimic the behavior of most known mechanisms generating time-varying bargaining power.
This extension allows us to decompose the labor wedge into three dierent shocks: the separation shock, the matching shock and the bargaining shock. The separation shock determines the proportion of employed workers that get separated from their jobs every period and stay such until the next. The matching shock determines the number of new matches being formed every period given the number of unemployed people searching for a job and the number of vacancies posted by rms. The bargaining shock determines the proportions in which the lifetime surplus of a newly formed match is split between the worker and the rm. We show that the labor wedge of CKM can be directly reconstructed from these three shocks.
Our methodology follows that of CKM in its main points. We use data on real GDP, consumption, investment, hours, unemployment and vacancies to recover the six shocks: TFP, investment, government consumption, separation, matching and bargaining. To measure the contributions of each shock to each of the six variables we t the shocks back into the model one at a time and all but one at a time. The contributions are measured on average -over the whole period from 1964 to 2007, and in bad times -during the last ve recession episodes.
We conrm CKM's statement that eciency (TFP) and labor wedges explain virtually all of the variations in output; and nd that the labor wedge is mainly driven by shocks to matching eciency. However, both job creation and job destruction shocks play an important role in output and unemployment uctuations. This last result has direct implications for the debate between Fujita and Ramey (2007, [9] ) and Shimer (2005, [20] ) on whether job destruction or job creation is more important for uctuations in unemployment and output.
We nd that job destruction and job creation shocks play a role at dierent points in time. At the beginning of a recession the decline in TFP coincides with an increase in the separation rate. So layos caused by low productivity in the real sector start the recession. As unemployment increases, the reservation value (threat-point) of the workers goes down while an increase in their bargaining power keeps the wage fairly constant. This increase in the bargaining power is consistent with most forms of wage stickiness proposed in the literature. The corresponding decrease in the bargaining power of the rms causes a decline in vacancies. Later the eciency of the matching process falls (we attribute it to some form of disorganization), keeping unemployment at a high level.
Our results also provide an potential solution to Shimer's puzzle. Shimer (2005, [19] ) pointed out that standard Mortensen-Pissarides-type models are incapable of generating the observed high volatility of unemployment and vacancies and low volatility of wages. Hall (2005, [13] ) suggested that changes in the bargaining powergenerated by uctuations in the marginal product of labor and sticky wages -are necessary to solve the puzzle. In our model the bargaining power of the workers increases in recessions because their reservation value falls and the wage does not. This mechanism allows us to match the observed volatility of unemployment, vacancies and wages. Hence, considering changes in the reservation value of workers can solve Shimer's puzzle.
Thus our paper has three main results. First, in a search environment the labor wedge is mainly driven by matching shocks. Second, both job creation and job destruction shocks are important for business-cycle uctuations: while separation shocks start recessions, matching shocks are responsible for its depth and slow recovery. Third, allowing for changes in the reservation value of workers can solve Shimer's puzzle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical framework and introduces the six shocks, Section 3 describes the methodology we use to estimate the model and recover the shocks, Section 4 explains the results and Section 5 concludes.
II. Theoretical Framework
In this section we describe a model economy that modies the standard one sector real business cycle model by adding a search technology for moving labor between productive activities and leisure as in Farmer and Hollenhorst (2006, [7] ).
In the following subsections we rst describe a decentralized version of the model economy, we then show the solution to the same model when solved as a social planner's problem. The decentralized version of the model has a missing equilibrium condition that is typically replaced with a Nash bargaining condition to x the real wage. We use the fact that there is a missing condition to our advantage, and by comparing the social planner's solution with the decentralized version of the model, we construct a time varying bargaining shock, which will implicitly determine the wage level.
II.1. A Decentralized Model. The economy is populated by a continuum of families and each family operates a backyard technology. The members of the family cannot work in their own backyard. There are two market activities: head-hunting which is competitive and a productive activity where the wage is set according to a specic wage-setting rule.
There are six exogenous shocks. A total factor productivity (TFP) shock A t , an investment specic technology shock T t , a government expenditure shock G t , a shock to the separation rate of employment δ Lt , a shock to matching eciency B t and a shock to the bargaining power of workers φ t . This last shock φ t represents the fraction of the lifetime surplus of the match that goes to the worker, hence, as we will show later on, φ t determines the wage w t of the productive sector.
At the beginning of period t values of Each family maximizes the discounted present value of their utility function, subject to a budget constraint and labor supply and demand accumulation constraints:
subject to
whereM t is the total number of matches formed in the economy in period t. Labor supply in period t depends on last period's labor supply minus the workers that got separated from their job plus the new formed matches;M t U t is the job nding rate and represents the increase in employment when there is one more individual searching for a job (U t increases by one unit). Labor demand accumulates in the same way as labor supply with the dierence that the term V 
The resource constraint is given by
where
and
Finally, the optimality conditions of the model are
In the equations above µ t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the labor supply accumulation constraint and η t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the labor demand accumulation constraint. Together with equations (5), (6), (7), the aggregate labor accumulation equation (14) and the matching function (15) they completely describe the solution to the decentralized problem. We shall discuss the rst order conditions of the model later. 
The model is missing an equilibrium condition because equations (9) and (10) determine two dierent ways of moving labor between leisure and employment in productive activities and there is only one price w t . Therefore the model has multiple equilibria and every wage corresponds to one of them. We shall introduce a bargaining shock, as mentioned earlier on, to determine which equilibrium is chosen.
II.2. The Social Planner's Problem. To compare competitive allocations with the ecient ones we solve the social planning problem. The social planner maximizes the discounted present value of the utility function:
The optimality conditions of the planner are given by:
Together with equations (5), (6), (7), (14) and (15) 
so that the optimality conditions on vacancies and unemployment are the same in the decentralized and planner's problem. Furthermore, if we assume that the matching function has constant returns to scale
then Γ t = µ t + η t and the decentralized outcome is Pareto-optimal. Hence, the Hosios condition for eciency is given by:
As an illustration, assume
, which together with conditions (25) and (26) give
Notice that if we replace equations (27) and (28) in equations (9) and (10) and sum them up, we get equation (20) , hence the optimality conditions for labor in the decentralized version become equal to the optimality condition for labor in the planners problem.
Furthermore, if we divide equation (9) by equation (10) and use equations (27) and (28) we get
Given that w t is the wage earned by the worker, and −
is his reservation utility,
represents the value of the match earned by the worker. Since the bargaining power of the worker is constant and equal to θ, the optimal wage rate satises
is the dierence between the marginal product of labor and the marginal disutility of labor. This term represents the instantaneous marginal value of the match, and a fraction θ goes to the worker. To introduce the time varying bargaining shock we build on this result, re-parameterize and substitute θ by φ t . φ t is time varying and will follow an exogenous autorregressive process that will be dened later. Notice that replacing θ by φ t implies that allocations are suboptimal whenever φ t = θ.
Equations (27) and (28) are replaced by
once again if we substitute equations (29) and (30) in (9) and (10) we get equation (20) so it is still true that the optimality conditions for labor of the decentralized version imply the optimality condition for labor of the planner's problem. Dividing equation (9) by equation (10) and using equations (29) and (30) we get
hence, the optimal wage rate satises
(1 − δ Lt+1 ) and can be interpreted as a stochastic discount factor for labor.
Equations (20), (9) and (10) can be iterated forward to solve for the corresponding multipliers:
The Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint for labor Γ t is the expected sum of instantaneous marginal values of the match discounted and adjusted for the probability of the match being dissolved in any given period. Similarly, the Lagrange multiplier in the labor demand (supply) accumulation equation is the expected sum of instantaneous marginal values of the match for the representative rm (worker), discounted and adjusted for the probability of the match being dissolved in any given period. The variable φ t represents the fraction of the gross value of the match going to the worker, and (1 − φ t ) the fraction of the gross value of the match going to the rm. Hence, we call φ t the bargaining power of the worker as well as the bargaining shock.
II.4. Equilibrium Conditions for the Model Economy and Functional Forms.
The competitive equilibrium of the model economy is a solution to the following equations
are the exogenous shocks of the model. The exogenous variables behave according to stochastic processes to be dened later.
Equation (31) is the standard Euler equation. Equation (32) governs the behavior of the total value of the match. Today's value is equal to the instantaneous gain from a newly formed match plus the future value, discounted and adjusted for the possibility of being destroyed tomorrow.
Equations (33) and (34) equate the marginal benets and marginal costs of headhunting and searching for a job respectively and thus pin down vacancies and unemployment. Equations (35) and (36) determine the real wage and the discount factor for labor. Equations (37), (38) and (39) are the resource constraints for consumption, investment and output. In turn equations (40) and (41) govern the dynamics of hours and the new matches.
Most of the functional forms we use are standard in the literature. We assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale:
We assume that the matching function is also Cobb-Douglas and consistent with constant returns to scale mentioned above:
We postulate a utility function consistent with a balanced growth path and where fractions of time spent head-hunting and searching for a job enter symmetrically with the time spent on the production activity:
The functional form for hours is the only non-standard assumption we make. It implies that workers get the same disutility from working in market activities as when searching for a job. This assumption may seem somewhat extreme, but we assume that although individuals spend only a few hours per week searching for a job, they also spend time in other activities that generate disutility: in expanding their network by making phone calls, getting technical training, continuing their education, helping their relatives or working in home production.
In the decomposition we perform, this utility function aects the behavior of the reservation value of the workers. The parameter γ determines how much the reservation value falls as they spend less time in the labor market. Given these functional forms and stochastic processes for the shocks, to be explained later, the shocks are uniquely identied. Appendix A explains step by step how given data on output, consumption, investment, hours, unemployment and vacancies one can recover the shocks.
III. Estimation Procedure
This section describes the details of the estimation procedure. Our estimation strategy is dierent from that of CKM in three dimensions. First, though some of the parameters can be calibrated, others have no analogs in the literature. We estimate them using the Kalman lter and what is becoming standard -Markov Chain MonteCarlo (MCMC) methods.
Second, estimation results can depend signicantly (see Cogley and Nason (1995) [6] ) on the the way the data is pre-ltered. In order to avoid certain ltering biases we minimize the extent to which we alter the data. We embed the trends into the model. We describe in detail a procedure of detrending the model around a non-stationary stochastic trend, which we borrow from Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2006 [8] ).
Finally, because many of the parameters of the model are estimated using MCMC methods, we use the same approach to recover the shocks. We apply the Kalman lter to the linearized version of the model to compute the stochastic innovations of the shocks. III.1. Processes for the shocks. In the data real output, consumption and investment are nonstationary even with respect to a log-linear trend. To make the data comparable to the model the business cycle literature commonly uses the HodrickPrescott (HP) lter. However, Cogley and Nason (1995 [6] ) and Canova (1998 [4] ) show that the use of the lter introduces signicant biases into the data by amplifying business-cycle frequencies even if it does not have any. To avoid using any kind of lter we follow the approach presented in Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2006 [8] ) and assume random walks for the two processes that are commonly thought to be extremely persistent: the TFP and investment shocks.
Here a ss is the mean growth rate of TFP, τ ss can be interpreted as the mean growth rate of the investment-specic technology. We assume that the rest of the shocks follow rst-order autoregressive processes. Here lower-case variable g t corresponds to detrended government consumption to be dened later.
where δ Lss is the separation rate in steady-state, B ss determines the fraction of hours spent on head-hunting in steady-state, φ ss is the average bargaining power which determines the vacancy-unemployment ratio, g ss is the steady-state fraction of GDP consumed by the government. Also σ · and ρ · denote the standard deviations and autocorrelations of the shocks. All innovations ε ·t are assumed to be standard normal. We do not put restrictions on the correlations of these innovations.
III.2. Detrending. Here we describe how to detrend the model with respect to a pair of nonstationary trends. From the optimality conditions of the model we can see that all variables except capital grow at a factor (a ss τ α ss ) 1 1−α . Then, if we take the rst dierences of the TFP and investment shocks by dening a t =
t , which will be common to all the variables except capital. Hence, we can dene detrended variables of the form:
. Capital grows at a factor (a ss τ ss ) 1 1−α , so it is detrended as follows:
Similarly to the result of King et. al. (1988 [15] ) given separability of the utility function, we need to assume logarithmic utility for there to exist a balanced growth path. This will not aect our results since Hansen (1986, [14] ) has shown that quantitatively the degree of risk aversion has almost no eect on the behavior of quantities in real business cycle models.
Substituting detrended variables into the model, we come to the following representation:
This model possesses a unique steady-state. We describe the algorithm of computing the steady-state in Appendix B. We linearize the model around the steady-state, compute the state-space representation and estimate.
III.3. Measurement Equations. We use six variables in our estimation procedure: 1) real per capita GDP, 2) real per capita nondurable consumption expenditures, 3) real per capita gross private domestic investment (including durable consumption), 4) an index of aggregate weekly per capita hours worked in private industries, 5) the unemployment rate and 6) the Conference Board help-wanted advertising index as a proxy for vacancies.
All data are seasonally adjusted. Monthly data is averaged to make it quarterly. We divide by population to obtain per capita values. This corresponds to modeling the economy using a representative household/rm. We remove an extremely low frequency trend from hours, unemployment and vacancies, using an hp-lter with a smoothing parameter 100000 (we follow Shimer (2005, [19] )). This removes longrun secular trends, which are a result of demographic and other factors unrelated to business cycles. We normalize the resulting detrended indexes of hours and vacancies to one on average. We take logs of GDP, consumption and investment, and then take the rst dierence. All data we use is for the period 1964:I-2007:III.
To be able to estimate the model we need to add six measurement equations corresponding to the six variables that we observe. Since the data for real output, consumption and investment are modeled as nonstationary, we take the rst dierences of the data to make it comparable to the model. In addition, the denition of output in our model includes time spent head-hunting. In the real economy rms are paying head-hunters a wage and it is measured as part of GDP. To account for this, we derive the shadow price of time spent head-hunting, multiply it by the amount of time spent in this activity and include the product in our denition of GDP.
Hours in our model correspond to the total time spend on the productive activity and head-hunting. This index corresponds closely to employment, since most of the cyclical variation in hours is on the extensive margin (see Gertler, Sala, Trigari (2006, [10] ) and [13])).
Due to the above correspondence between hours and employment, the fraction of time spent by the representative agent searching for a job of the total time spent in the labor market also corresponds to the number of people searching for a job as a fraction of people participating in the labor market -the unemployment rate.
Changes in the help-wanted advertising index proxy changes in the number of vacancies posted by rms in the real economy. To make the model over-identied 2 we add a measurement error to the variable which is measured worst -the index of vacancies.
III.4. Calibration and Estimation. Our model has 9 structural parameters and 13
parameters that characterize the shocks. The scale parameter L ss does not aect the log-linearized representation of the model. There are three parameters standard to the business-cycle literature that we calibrate. We set the share of capital in the CobbDouglas production function α to 0.34, the discount factor β to 0.99, the depreciation rate δ K to 2.5 % per quarter. We set the steady-state value of the government shock to 22% of GDP, the average value in the data. We also set the elasticity of matches to unemployment θ to 0.7, the value used by Shimer (2005, [19] ) and falls within the range of values plausible from a microeconomic perspective reported by Blanchard and Diamond (1989, [3] ). We calibrate this parameter because it is not well-identied. We nd that this value of θ helps us match the volatility of wages, which are not used in our estimation procedure.
From the average growth rates of investment, consumption and output we infer the means of innovations to TFP and investment shocks. We calibrate them to be 0.16 percent and 0.12 percent per quarter respectively. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters. We estimate the model using Bayesian methods (see An Table 2 reports the prior and posterior distributions of each structural parameter. We estimate the elasticity of the utility function with respect to labor to be 3.54. The high elasticity leads to large variations in the value of non-market activity to be discussed later. [19] ) quarterly estimate of the separation probability for employed workers. This dierence comes from the fact that our separation rate corresponds to the average fraction of productive time destroyed and remaining such until next quarter. Assuming (following Shimer) that the average job nding rate is 40% per month and the separation rate to be 3% per month, the eective number of people becoming and staying unemployed until next quarter should be around 2-3%, which is consistent with our estimate. Our model implies a 61% average job-nding rate which is also comparable to Shimer's estimates.
We estimate the steady-state bargaining power φ ss to be 0.56, which is close to the value of 0.5 common in the literature (see Mortensen and Nagypal (2007, [17] ) and Hall (2005, [13] )). The estimates of the two parameters ω ss and φ ss jointly imply, that the average reservation utility is approximately 80% of the marginal product. This is close to Hagedorn and Manovsky's (2007, [11] ) calibration of the value of non-market activity (0.95) and much higher than the calibration of Hall (0.4). Our estimate of the parameter ω ss also pins down the ratio of time spent head-hunting to time spent in the production activity which turns out to be 4%. Taking into account the proximity of the shadow prices of dierent allocations of time, this mimics closely Hagedorn and Manovsky's estimate of the cost of vacancies being 3-4.5% of the quarterly wage. However, unlike their model, most of the variation in the bargaining set comes from variations in the value of non-market activity, not the marginal product. Table 3 reports the prior and posterior distributions of the persistence and variance parameters of the shocks. The separation rate is the least persistent with a quarterly autoregressive parameter equal to 0.72. The matching and government shocks are more persistent, but still signicantly less persistent than a random walk. The persistence of government consumption is 0.90 -exactly like in the data. The bargaining shock is close to a random walk. See Figures in Appendix D to compare the prior and posterior distributions of the parameters. Our model explains 100% of the variation in the six variables and thus provides a decomposition we need for the business cycle accounting exercise. The measurement error explains only negligible 1 percent of variation in vacancies and does not aect other variables.
IV. Results
We start with the analysis and interpretation of the behavior of the labor wedge produced by the model and the underlying shocks. Following most of the literature we dene the labor wedge as the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption (MRS) and marginal product of labor (MP). Figure 1 depicts the behavior of these two determinants of the labor wedge. The picture forces one to conclude that most of the volatility of the labor wedge comes from variations in the marginal rate of substitution, rather than the marginal product. Though we estimate the elasticity of the utility function to be high, this result is true for most values of the elasticity used in the macro literature. In our model the labor wedge has a new interpretation. The MRS represents the reservation value (outside option) of workers when bargaining over the wage, which implies that the dierence between the MP and the MRS represents the instantaneous welfare gain of a new match. It is clear from Figure 1 that the bargaining set narrows in good times and widens signicantly in recessions. Thus, in our model increases in the labor wedge manifest decreases in the value of new matches and vice versa.
The same Figure depicts the behavior of wages predicted by the model and compares it to data (adjusted for the stochastic trend). The model predicts wages which are as volatile as in the data and the correlation between the two is high (0.56). The wage level splits the instantaneous value of the match between the worker and the rm in the proportion of their bargaining weights. Figure 1 demonstrates that while the reservation value of workers falls in recessions, wages stay fairly constant, thus, indicating that the bargaining power of workers increases in recessions. This result supports wage stickiness as a mechanism behind the large changes in the bargaining power of the workers. However, unlike previous models, where increases in the bargaining power in recessions were a result of declines in the marginal product, in our model they are a consequence of declines in the reservation value (MRS). Figure 2 describes the behavior of the six shocks over the whole forty-ve year period. The shaded vertical areas correspond to the ocial recession periods according to NBER. Note that TFP and investment shocks are random walks with drifts, while the rest of the processes are stationary. We nd that total factor productivity slows down at the beginning of each recession. The investment specic technology tends to rather increase in recessions and has a negligible eect on output and the labor market variables. This supports the main nding of CKM, that the investment wedge plays only a tertiary role in U.S. business cycles. The government shock as well as the investment shock only aect consumption and investment. Because we are primarily interested in the behavior of output, hours, unemployment and vacancies, for the rest of the exposition we shall abstract from the behavior of investment and government shocks.
From Figure 2 one can also see, that the separation shock tends to be high at the beginning of each recession. The spikes in the separation rate typically coincide with spikes observed in Shimer's data. The wave of separations usually starts earlier than the recession itself and dies out quickly -within a year after the start of a recession. As we conjectured from the behavior of the bargaining set, the bargaining power of workers increases signicantly during recessions manifesting wage stickiness as a major source of ineciency in the labor market. Notice also the large decreases in the matching eciency during recessions. Now let us turn to the question of why we get these large swings in the marginal rate of substitution and in the matching eciency and the bargaining power. We argue that any model, where workers and rms decide on the margin whether to search for a job and whether to open a vacancy, would predict changes in the incentives and shocks of a similar magnitude.
First, notice that when workers choose whether to search for a job (equation (13)), they equate the cost of searching for a job, equal to the MRS in our model, with the potential benets of forming a match times the probability of nding a party to match. The benets are equal to the present discounted value of the wages minus the cost of working, which is also equal to MRS:
Given that in the data the job nding probability
declines signicantly in recessions (documented by Shimer (2005, [19] )) and the wage is fairly constant, equation (73) implies that the MRS has to fall by a fair amount. This is exactly what we get as a result of the estimate of the elasticity of the utility function of 3.54 -a signicantly higher value than values of around 0.5 typically assumed in the RBC literature. This result leads us to obtain a much more volatile series for the labor wedge, which, nonetheless, behaves very similarly to previous estimates. For a comparison of our labor wedge with the labor wedge of CKM see Appendix E.
Secondly, notice that when rms choose whether to open a new vacancy, they also equate the competitive salary they pay to a head-hunter with the potential benets of forming a match times the probability of nding a worker to ll the vacancy. The benets are equal to the present discounted value of the marginal product minus the wage, they pay to the worker:
Given that we have already established the signicant decreases in the MRS in recessions, and taking into account that in the data unemployment increases, while the number of vacancies falls and both the wage and the marginal product are not very volatile, equation (74) implies that the matching eciency has to fall signicantly in recessions.
Combining equations (73) and (74) one can nd that the bargaining power of the workers is directly pinned down by the market tightness:
Thus, when unemployment increases and there are fewer vacancies, the bargaining power of workers has to increase by a comparable amount. Variations in the separation rate that we estimate are a residual of the labor accumulation equation in the productive sector.
To summarize, by allowing for changes in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and consequently for changes in the reservation value of workers, our model both matches the volatile behavior of unemployment and vacancies and predicts absence of signicant uctuations in wages, just like in the data. Thus, our model provides an alternative mechanism which can explain Shimer's puzzle.
Correlation Table 4 . Cross Correlations of Shocks and Their Lags Let us now take a closer look at the timing and contributions of the shocks to the variables of interest. Table 4 displays cross correlations of the shocks calculated using log deviations from steady-states. From the table it is clear that declines in TFP slightly precede increases in the separation rate. An increase in the separation rate is typically followed by an increase in the bargaining power of workers which precedes or coincides with a decrease in the matching shock. This implies that shocks to the separation rate are important at the early stages of recessions and matching and bargaining shocks come into play later.
Shutting down innovations to each one of the shocks reveals a striking picture. Figure 3 shows that absence of separation and bargaining shocks leaves the labor wedge essentially unchanged, while absence of shocks to matching eciency produces an essentially constant labor wedge. Thus, most of the uctuations in the labor wedge are explained by matching shocks.
To analyze the eects of each shock on output and unemployment and the timing patterns, we shall focus on the 2001 recession episode which is the last recession in our sample. Although only matching shocks matter for the labor wedge, the impact on output is not so clear-cut. Figure 4 illustrates the eects of TFP shocks, investment shocks and the labor wedge. Here by the eect of the labor wedge we mean the joint eect of separation, bargaining and matching shocks. Appendix C provides a closed form expression for the labor wedge as a combination of these three shocks, thus, demonstrating that TFP, investment and government shocks do not aect the behavior of the labor wedge. The vertical axes measures percentage deviations from the path that output would have followed, if all the wedges were constant (the random walks would preserve their drifts). The solid line depicts the actual path of output in the data. The rest of the lines depict the paths of output if we shut down innovations to just one of the shocks, eliminating its eect on the economy. Figure 4 shows that if there was no change in the labor wedge, the recession would have been much shorter (if at all noticeable) and twice less severe. If there was no change in total factor productivity, the recession probably wouldn't have started. Absence of investment shocks would have almost no eect on the path of output. Thus the TFP shock is at work mostly at the start of the recession of 2001. The labor wedge explains the bulk of uctuations in output after the recession has started. Figure 5 is the key to our paper. It decomposes the eect of the labor wedge into three pieces: the separation shock, the matching shock and the bargaining shock. Similarly to the previous graph, the solid line shows the deviation of output from the path it would have taken, if all the wedges were kept constant starting in the fall quarter of 1999. The three other lines depict the paths of output if only one of the three labor shocks returned to its steady-state level.
It is clear from Figure 4 , that if there were no separation shocks at the early stage of the recession, output would have fallen by twice as little. The bargaining shocks add to the depth of the recession while the matching shock is key to the slow recovery: in absence of the adverse matching shocks the economy would have fully recovered from the recession by summer of 2003. Output with all but one shock: TFP, investment, labor wedge Figure 5 demonstrates, that although matching shocks explain a huge fraction of changes in output, they also start impacting output only after the recession has already started. As we conjectured from Table 4 , shocks to TFP and the separation rate start recessions by accounting for the initial slowdown in output, while the role of bargaining and matching shocks is to deepen the recession and delay the recovery. Figure 6 depicts a similar decomposition of unemployment. It follows from Figure  6 that separation shocks are responsible for the initial increase in unemployment. Increases in the bargaining power of workers start playing a role only once the economy is already in a recession, reinforcing this initial increase in unemployment. Declines in matching eciency leave unemployment at a high level for a longer period of time after the recession has already ended, thus accounting for the so-called jobless recovery.
Thus, after some rms in the economy have become less productive, the role of the separation wedge is to create the initial pool of unemployed people. As the number of unemployed goes up, the reservation value of workers goes down signicantlythey desperately need jobs. The sluggish response of wages drives up the bargaining power of the workers while the rm is now in a worsened position. As a result rms start posting less vacancies, and there are more and more unemployed in the market. Consistent with this explanation, the sharp increase in the bargaining power of workers accounts for the bulk of changes in unemployment and vacancies in the second phase of the recession. As the number of workers seeking for jobs is high and the number of vacancies is low, the matching eciency goes down, thus causing output to fall deeper and the recession to last longer. Figure 6 conrms that if there was no decline in matching eciency the recovery from the recession would have been much faster. Hence, the so called "jobless recovery" is due mainly to matching shocks. We attribute this to some form of congestion, which still seeks an explanation. In terms of modeling it might be the case that our assumption of constant returns to scale is wrong, and when there are more parties searching for a match, the system gets congested, which would imply decreasing returns. It can also be some form of disorganization, when the least ecient and more specialized workers become desperate of nding a job and wait until better times, consistent with ideas of rest unemployment.
To measure the contribution of each shock we set all the other shocks to their steady-state values and simulate the model. We obtain paths of output, hours, unemployment and vacancies which would have taken place, if all the other distortions except one were absent. Table 5 reports the fractions of standard deviations over the whole period of output, hours, unemployment and vacancies, that can be explained by each one of the wedges. The contribution of the "labor wedge" is measured by hitting the economy by all three shocks: separation, bargaining and matching -at the same time. Table 5 . Ratios of standard deviations explained by each shock over the whole period Table 6 reports the same numbers from the original paper by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007, [5] Table 7 reports the same fractions of standard deviations as Table 5 , but averaged over a selection of recession periods. It demonstrates that during recessions the labor wedge and TFP play a slightly more important role in business cycles that in normal times, while the contribution of investment shocks are negligible both in recessions and overall. These results address the debate between Fujita and Ramey (2007, [9] ) and Shimer (2005, [20] ) on whether job destruction or job creation is more important for uctuations in unemployment and output. We nd that although shocks to job creation are more important for the behavior of output and unemployment, shocks to job destruction cannot be ignored. Changes in the separation rate account for a significant fraction of uctuations and explain the initial increase in unemployment and decrease in output which start the recession. Thus, even though their contribution is relatively smaller, without job destruction shocks recessions might not be there in the rst place. Appendix G demonstrates that these results are not a feature of the last recession only, but are robust across the last four recessions.
V. Conclusion
Motivated by the fact that variations in the labor wedge account for a large fraction of business cycle uctuations, we develop a theory of the labor wedge and quantitatively analyze it using a model that features time-varying search and matching frictions in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, [18] ), Shimer (2005, [19] ) and Hall (2005, [12] ). Using a methodology similar to that of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007, [5] ) we identify the sources of uctuations and assess the importance of job creation and job destruction shocks for business cycles.
To do so we introduce exogenous shocks to the separation rate and the matching eciency that determine how many jobs are destroyed and created every period, and incorporate an exogenous process, governing uctuations in the bargaining power, general enough to mimic the behavior of most known mechanisms generating timevarying bargaining power. This extension allows us to decompose the labor wedge into three dierent shocks: the separation shock, the matching shock and the bargaining shock.
We nd that the labor wedge is mainly driven by matching shocks. However, both job creation and job destruction shocks play an important role in output and unemployment uctuations. This last result has direct implications for the debate between Fujita and Ramey (2007, [9] ) and Shimer (2005, [20] ) on whether job destruction or job creation is more important for uctuations in unemployment and output.
We nd that job destruction and job creation shocks play a role at dierent points in time. In a recession, separation shocks account for the initial increase in unemployment, while matching shocks are responsible for the slow recovery.
Our results provide a potential solution to Shimer's puzzle. In our model the bargaining power of the workers increases in recessions because their reservation value falls and the wage does not. This mechanism allows us to match the observed volatility of unemployment, vacancies and wages. Hence, introducing variations in the reservation value of workers is a feature worth exploring in search and matching models.
Finally, given that matching shocks are the main source of ineciency in the labor market and explain most of the volatility of output and unemployment, we strongly encourage the use of tools that can help smooth the matching process, such as online job sites like careerbuilder.com and monster.com. Also, taking into account the nding that separation shocks tend to start recessions, identifying the causes of layos might help avoid them.
VI. Appendix. VI.1. Appendix A. Identication. In this section we show how given data on allocations: output, investment, consumption, employment, vacancies and unemployment one can solve for the wedges. Let us rst rewrite the equations of the model given the parametric assumptions and functional forms used in the paper:
Now we shall describe a mechanism to recover the wedges given parameters and functional forms. Given data on consumption C t (or government spending 
Using equation (83) the lagrange multiplier µ t can be expressed as a function of the matching shock B t :
Also the separation rate is connected to the matching shock through the labor accumulation equation (79):
Then substituting equations (87) and (88) into equation (86) we obtain: 
Equation (VI.1) provides a forward-looking equation for the matching shock B t+1 as a function of B t . Solving this equation recursively given some initial value B 0 we can recover the whole path for the matching shock. Then equation (88) allows us to back up the separation rate, equations (84) and (83) allow us to calculate the lagrange multipliers µ t and η t . Then from equation (85) we can compute the bargaining wedge φ t .
Altogether equations (76-85) describe a one-to-one mapping between the data and the underlying wedges. However the algorithm described here is hard to implement directly for two reasons. First, the equations are forward looking and can only be solved under certain assumptions about expectation formation. Second, many of the parameters of the model are unknown and cannot be simply calibrated from microeconomic data. That is the reason why we postulate stochastic processes for the wedges, linearize the model around a steady-state to compute an approximate solution and use Kalman lter to recover the underlying processes for the wedges. (33) and (34) and taking into account the functional forms we get:
Combining equation (90) 
Substituting these into equation (32) moving everything except the marginal product to one side we get:
where we dene the inverse lag operator as follows
X t = E (X t+1 |Ω t ) Equation (93) shows how the separation, bargaining and matching wedges together form connection between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption: the labor wedge. 
